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A number of scientific writers have proposed manipulating the ecology of Mars in order 
to make the planet more comfortable for future immigrants from Earth.  However, the 
ethical acceptability of such ‘terraforming’ proposals remains unresolved.  In response, in 
this article I explore some of these scientific proposals through the lens provided by 
Buddhist environmental ethics that are quantitatively expressed by practitioners in the 
ethnographic field of the United States.  What I find is that contemporary Buddhists 
combine philosophical notions of interconnectedness with moral considerations not to 
harm others and then creatively extend this combined sensibility to the protection 
specifically of abiotic features of Mars.  In so doing these Buddhists significantly reject 
proposals to alter the Martian ecology planet-wide as beyond the ethical right of humans.  
Along the way these Buddhists also importantly provide an innovative basis for enriching 
Buddhist environmental ethical protection of abiotic locations, and this strengthening can 
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American Buddhist Protection of Stones in terms of Climate Change on Mars and Earth 
 
Introduction 
In his futuristic work Genesis: An Epic Poem of the Terraforming of Mars, 
Professor Frederick Turner (2011) offers a fascinating fiction-based meditation on the 
oft-proposed planet-wide ecological manipulation of the Red Planet.  In Turner’s story 
the leader of the United Nations mission to Mars, Chance Van Riebeck, violates 
regulations by introducing bioengineered organisms into the Martian ecosystem in order 
to make the planet’s environment more Earthlike and hence more comfortable for human 
colonists.  Aiding the establishment of these organisms, some of Van Riebeck’s followers 
purloin an ice moon of Saturn, rename it Comet Kali, and intentionally smash it into 
Mars in order to gain gases to thicken the Martian atmosphere and water to support 
imported life (131).  With a richer atmosphere, Mars becomes warmer, and plants, 
animals, and running water abound, so that Mars more closely resembles contemporary 
Earth.  In the course of this process, various characters in Turner’s story supply critiques 
both in favor of and opposing this type of planetary ecological manipulation, engendering 
many analytic hues within the poem.  Nonetheless, in the end the proponents of 
renovating Mars win, the planet’s atmosphere becomes humid and breathable for 
humans, and ‘a new branch of natural history’ (310) results from the wholesale bio- and 
geo-engineered makeover of the world. 
While Turner’s poem should be recommended for its intelligence and originality, 
many other science fiction writers have explored the planet-wide ecological manipulation 
of Mars, perhaps most notably Kim Stanley Robinson (1993, 1994, 1996).  But the idea 
of transforming planetary ecologies arises in academic scientific nonfiction as well, like 
that of Fogg (1995).  Indeed, as the NASA astrobiologist Christopher P. McKay states, 
‘The scientific community considers planetary ecosynthesis on Mars as a serious topic in 
space research’ (McKay 2009, 254).  It is these nonfictional, scientific proposals that 
occupy my focus in this essay, which ethnographically explores American Buddhist 
ethical responses to such scenarios.  It should be recognised that there are gradations in 
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these proposals, from small alterations of the planet intended to encourage very local life 
forms to planet-wide changes aimed to benefit immigrants from Earth.  In this essay I 
restrict my gaze to the second, large-scale and Earthling-friendly type of planetary 
transformation in examining proposals by the scientific writers Beech (2009) and Zubrin 
(1996).   
I exclude Earth geoengineering from my ecological manipulation analysis, 
because making Earth more friendly to Earth life remains a morally, ecologically, 
financially, and practically different affair from making Mars more comfortable for 
Earthlings.  In fact, as I will share more in the Discussion section, attitudes among 
Buddhists in this study toward the ecological manipulation of Mars retain useful ethical 
application for mitigating climate change on Earth by morally directing lithospheric 
carbon sequestration strategies, which transform atmospheric carbon dioxide into stone. 
Whether in science journals or fiction, large-scale planetary alterations of Mars 
often are called ‘terraforming,’ although one also can find other terms in the scientific 
literature such as ‘planetary ecosynthesis’ (Graham 2004, 168) or ‘planetary ecopoiesis’ 
(Haynes 1990, 161).  In this essay I will eschew these misleading euphemisms.  If I were 
to dig a hole in my back yard to install a swimming pool, that technically is 
‘terraforming,’ or ‘shaping Earth.’  Yet intentionally altering an entire planet’s 
atmosphere is a different pursuit than is building a swimming pool, so especially on a 
nonEarth planet the word ‘terraforming’ misses the mark.  Likewise, ‘planetary 
ecosynthesis’ sounds rather polite, and ‘ecopoiesis,’ ‘home making,’ has a comforting 
ring to it.  But, as I will share more fully, Buddhists in this study two-to-one reject the 
practice, many of them considering it neither polite nor comforting.  Therefore, in this 
essay I will denote this practice descriptively by what it intends: planet-wide ecological 
manipulation. 
Despite the frequency with which the planet-wide ecological manipulation of 
Mars appears in literature as well as the practice’s role as ‘the poster-boy problem of 
space ethics’ (Milligan 2015, 8) due to its centrality, the morality of the practice remains 
quite unresolved, as the space ethicist Tony Milligan ably explores in Nobody Owns the 
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Moon.  Some ethicists, like Robert Sparrow (1999), argue definitively against planet-
wide ecological manipulation, while others, such as James S. J. Schwartz (2013), find no 
intrinsic ethical problem with ecologically overhauling planets.  Part of this lack of 
resolution derives from the weakness in protecting abiotic entities like stone found across 
many systems of environmental ethics (Capper 2016a, 245-246).  While life may exist on 
Mars but be hidden for now (Weintraub 2018, 4), today preserving the environment of 
Mars presumably involves protecting abiotic locations, and environmental ethics 
arguments regarding abiotic spots remain difficult to make, including within Buddhist 
ethical worlds (Capper 2015, 65-67).   
Thus, one goal of this essay is to ameliorate this weakness within Buddhist 
environmental ethics by finding arguments for the protection of abiotic places like the 
regolith (assorted surface rocks and sands) of Mars.  As another provision, by turning to 
Mars as an ideal laboratory for developing abiotic environmental ethics due to the focus 
on geodiversity that the planet affords, I counteract a ‘life-bias in planetary protection 
ethics… that we can and should overcome’ (Schwartz 2016b, 31).  This dynamic 
provides a new perspective within the space ethics debate regarding the appropriateness 
of planet-wide ecological manipulation.  Therefore, this essay, residing at the intersection 
of Buddhist studies and astrobiology, intends to contribute novel and helpful advances 
within both Buddhist environmental ethics and space science, although no one should 
expect these contributions to represent the last words on the respective issues. 
These contributions arise from the ethnographic voices of American Buddhists, 
who provide a new understanding of the tradition and thereby enable innovative 
approaches to the related issues of protecting abiotic places, the ecological manipulation 
of Mars, and even the battle with climate change on Earth.  First, I provide context for 
these Buddhist voices by exploring some scientific and moral arguments in favor of 
changing the ecology of Mars as well as voices that oppose the practice.  I then introduce 
Buddhist perspectives, beginning with scriptural viewpoints.  Since most Buddhist 
scriptures were written roughly 2,000 years ago, when the ecological manipulation of 
Mars was not much contemplated, thereafter I supplement scriptural teachings with 
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ethnographic American Buddhist expressions.  As I will describe more fully, Buddhists 
from the field on the whole find the proposal to manipulate Mars’ ecology untenable, for 
together they tell us that humans morally do not have the right dramatically to alter an 
entire planet’s ecology.  The American Buddhist teacher David R. Loy writes, ‘Fantasies 
about terraforming Mars reveal less about the potential for an extraterrestrial colony than 
how estranged we have become from our planetary home’ (Loy 2018, 115), and many 
Buddhists in the field appear to feel similarly. 
Further, the American Buddhists in this study make a strong case, if a 
nontraditional one, for protecting and defending abiotic environments because of 
Buddhist notions of an interconnected universe that arises interdependently (Pāli: 
paṭiccasamuppāda) combined with an innovative expansion into abiotic ecologies of the 
monastic and lay precept against harming others (the ahimsa precept).  As such, these 
Buddhists provide avenues for a more transparent moral understanding regarding the 
protection of abiotic places, the ecological manipulation of other worlds, and, by 
extension, mitigation responses to the issue of Earth’s climate change.  Of course, one 
cohort of American Buddhists by itself will not overturn the momentum of a 2,500 year 
old religious tradition, but these practitioners can open the door to new types of Buddhist 
environmental ethical reflection regarding the lifeless entities upon which life depends, 
with this revitalised conversation’s representing a benefit by itself both for Mars and 
Earth. 
In a final contribution, this article also provides a rare record of lived Buddhist 
attitudes toward space exploration, which emerges as an impact of its own given the 
paucity of empirical data on the subject in the scholarly literature.  I begin by examining 
briefly the science of planet-wide ecological manipulation. 
 
Proponents of Ecological Overhaul 
In his book, Terraforming: The Creating of Habitable Worlds, the professor of 
astronomy Martin Beech (2009) scientifically argues strongly for the planet-wide 
ecological manipulation not just of Mars, but also of Venus, Jupiter’s moon Europa, and 
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other locations in our solar system.  Beech claims that humans ecologically have sullied 
their own planet to such an extent that planetary lifeboats are needed in order to ‘foster 
the growth of humanity’ (7).  Because of our environmental crisis, ‘We must either adapt 
ourselves to expect less, or we must adapt to other worlds, and here is humanity’s first 
big break, for we live in a Solar System full of prime terraforming real estate’ (9).  We 
know that we can seriously alter atmospheres quickly, Beech says, so we know that we 
can change places like Mars rapidly (10), and doing so will allow habitation, if not 
perfectly Earthlike, by plants, bioengineered animals, and humans (13).  Like in Turner’s 
poem, Beech tells us that we can reach this goal by crashing comets into Mars, freeing for 
use their ammonia gas to warm the atmosphere as well as their water, carbon dioxide, 
nitrogen, and oxygen.  A single comet of 10 km alone could create dramatic change, 
Beech relates (151-152).  Beech’s comet plan, recently shared as well by Professor Genta 
(2017, 278), may be startling to some readers but remains a staple within planet-wide 
ecological manipulation strategies, since it appears that Mars lacks the native carbon 
dioxide deposits to warm the planet or create atmospheric pressure enough to result in 
real ecological change (Jakosky and Edwards 2018, 634).   
After the planet enjoys induced warming from its thicker atmosphere, microbes, 
lichens, mosses, and trees can be introduced to create biodiversity that usefully alters the 
Martian atmosphere further (Beech 2009, 160-162).  In this way, Beech tells us, we can 
never make Mars a perfect twin of Earth, but we can make Mars a place where humans 
can live comfortably in terms of temperature, water resources, food sources, and 
protection from ultraviolet radiation (9, 143).  Although Beech follows a ‘fractionated’ 
(7), rather than all-or-nothing, approach to planetary manipulation, his proposal still 
results in the topic of this essay, a large-scale change to Mars’ ecology in favor of Earth 
beings. 
In his presentation Beech remains straightforward about his strong 
anthropocentric ethical presumptions, telling us that his motives exist ‘shamelessly on the 
side of doing what is best for the human race’ (11).  This strong anthropocentrism also 
marks the moral arguments for planet-wide ecological manipulation issued by one of the 
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most outspoken scientific aficionados of the practice, the aerospace engineer Robert 
Zubrin.  With strong anthropocentric zest Zubrin claims, ‘If we can terraform Mars, it 
will show that the worlds of the heavens themselves are subject to the human intelligent 
will’ (Zubrin 1996, 270),  while it demonstrates that ‘humans are more than just animals, 
that we are in fact creatures who carry a unique spark that is worthy of respect’ (271).  In 
a flourish Zubrin asserts that changing Mars’ ecology represents ‘the most profound 
vindication of the divine nature of the human, exercised in its highest form to bring a 
dead world to life....Failure to terraform Mars constitutes failure to live up to our human 
nature and a betrayal of our responsibility as members of the community of life itself’ 
(248-249).  For Zubrin, in other words, to be human necessarily is to bring life to lifeless 
planets.   
 
Against the Ecological Manipulation of Mars 
Both Beech and Zubrin offer arguments for changing Mar’s ecology that are 
moored in attitudes of strong anthropocentrism.  Deriving from a more ecocentric point 
of view, the philosopher Ian Stoner is one of the most recent to argue ethically against the 
planet-wide ecological manipulation of Mars.  Stoner’s counter-manipulation argument 
arises in the context of a larger claim that ‘we should refuse on moral grounds to establish 
a human presence on the surface of Mars’ (Stoner 2017, 334).  Stoner founds this 
discourse on two moral principles, ‘a principle constraining the use of invasive or 
destructive techniques of scientific investigation’ and ‘a principle governing appropriate 
human behavior in wilderness,’ (334) and from these principles argues against five 
reasons commonly given for colonising Mars.   
First, Stoner states, colonising Mars to gain the planet’s natural resources, like we 
find in both Beech’s and Zubrin’s proposals, should be rejected because resources are 
easier to gain from asteroids (337).  A second reason for the colonisation of Mars, to 
fulfill the pioneering spirit of humanity, fails for Stoner both in terms of doubts about the 
presence of this spirit and because expanding humanity’s footprint has worked out poorly 
at times in the past (337).  Stoner then dismisses the argument that Mars should be 
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colonised to provide experiments in human living by asserting that such experiments are 
best done in lightly inhabited places on Earth (338).  With vigor Stoner afterwards 
disposes of arguments for the human need of a backup planet, like is found at the center 
of Beech’s argument, by stressing, ‘A Mars colony would not insure against large-scale 
threats to the solar system, such as nearby supernovae, invading extraterrestrials, or an 
early expansion of the sun. Nor would it insure against threats we pose to ourselves, such 
as war and environmental destruction. We carry these threats to ourselves everywhere we 
go’ (339-340).   
The only reason for colonising Mars with which Stoner can agree is the fifth, to 
expand scientific knowledge.  But, because of his two ethical principles of scientific 
conservation and treading lightly in wilderness, he considers that the scientific 
exploration of Mars remains best done by robots, with humans absent (345).  From this 
position, Stoner then emphasises that his two principles mean that the planet-wide 
ecological manipulation of Mars ‘should remain forever science fiction. Any presence we 
establish on Mars should tread lightly and be minimally invasive, and that goal is 
incompatible with terraforming the planet’ (350). 
Each one of these perspectives, both for and against the ecological manipulation 
of Mars, bears important limitations.  Put succinctly, given Beech’s exclusive valuation 
of human welfare, if one values anything else in addition to human welfare, his 
arguments fall short.  Likewise, if one values the nonliving things that make life possible, 
Zubrin’s unilateral favoring of life over nonlife cannot supply a competent ethic.  Stoner 
defines ‘wilderness’ as ‘undeveloped or minimally developed land’ (Stoner 2017, 349), a 
model that implicitly arises from a false dualistic divide between the human and 
nonhuman natural worlds.  As the environmental historian William Cronon (1995, 69-90) 
has argued, even when physically absent from the ecologies around them, humans 
participate in some way – for instance culturally - in all of their surrounding 
environments, including uninhabited places.  Therefore, for Cronon, a noninteractive 
notion of ‘wilderness’ which is counterposed against the human world, like Stoner’s 
model, lacks conceptual coherence.   Given these weaknesses in the arguments of Beech, 
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Zubrin, and Stoner, the moral acceptability of the ecological manipulation of Mars 
remains undetermined. 
While I cannot comment much on the scientific feasibility of the planet-wide 
ecological manipulation of Mars, I can provide some clarity regarding its moral 
acceptability by turning to ethnographic data collected among American Buddhists in 
order to examine relevant ethical issues from new vistas.  As I will explain more fully, on 
the whole Buddhists in my study reject the ecological manipulation desired by Beech and 
Zubrin as something that humans have no right to undertake.  In so doing, they counter 
Beech’s strong anthropocentrism with a more ecocentric vision.  Interestingly for 
Buddhists, additionally they implicitly dispute Zubrin’s belief that to be human is to 
spread and support life by highlighting the value of abiotic ecologies against incursions 
from life forms.  These Buddhists further replace the dualism that is built into Stoner’s 
concept of ‘wilderness’ with a more interactive, relational environmental ethic that 
emerges from the idea of human interconnectedness with Mars and its features.  In so 
doing, they also uniquely stress the value of nonharm as applied to abiotic ecologies, 
creating ramifications for Buddhist approaches to Mars as well as the problem of Earth’s 
climate change.  I turn now to the voices of these Buddhists beginning with the scriptures 
that they read. 
 
Context from the scriptures 
The Buddha, who lived in what is now Nepal and India around 500 BCE, left us 
with a quite large corpus of teachings within scriptures, whether one looks at Buddhism 
from a Theravāda, Mahāyāna, or Vajrayāna point of view.  However, given the Buddha’s 
time period and those of the composers of the scriptures, one does not find direct 
discussions in the scriptural teachings of the appropriateness of manipulating Mars’ 
ecology.  We may find indirect hints at what the Buddha might have said, though, if life 
of some type is found on Mars.  The Buddha gave us strong ethics regarding treating 
animals with compassion (Pāli: karunā), lovingkindness (Pāli: mettā), and importantly for 
this essay, nonharm (Pāli: avihiṃsā, or as it has entered English from Sanskrit, ahimsa).  
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Nonharm includes physical nonviolence, of course, but also includes emotional or verbal 
nonviolence.  The Pāli scriptural Dhammapāda portrays nonharm memorably: ‘As a bee 
gathers nectar and moves on without harming the flower, its color, or its fragrance, just so 
should a sage walk through a village’ (Fronsdal 2006, 13).  Moreover, Pācitiyya rules 20 
and 62 in the Pāli Vinaya rules for monks, Pācitiyya rules 116 and 143 in the Pāli Vinaya 
rules for nuns, and similar provisions within other Vinaya versions demand nonharm 
protection of the habitats in which small life forms may reside, such as bodies of water 
(Ṭhānissaro Bhikkhu 2007; Ṭhānissaro Bhikkhu 2013, 353, 466).   
If life is found on Mars, it almost certainly will be in the form of microorganisms 
(Weintraub 2018, 263-269).  As long as those microorganisms are treated with ethics 
designed for animals, given the above injunctions the planet-wide ecological 
manipulation of Mars appears to be morally problematic because of the possible threats it 
will pose to that life and its habitats.  Raised temperatures, an altered atmosphere, and 
changed humidity on Mars could result in the destruction of indigenous life and its 
supportive surroundings.  Although arguments exist that a manipulated Mars may allow 
ancient Martian life forms to exit dormancy and again flourish (McKay 2009, 258), it 
must be remembered that the goal of the planet-wide manipulation of Mars’ ecology for 
proponents like Beech and Zubrin remains the comfort of Earthlings, not restoring the 
ecology of Mars from 4 billion years ago.  Any life forms that may be dormant will be 
challenged, and perhaps harmed, by the unprecedented ecological conditions emerging 
from this strategy. 
Of course, the ethical status of microorganisms remains unclear within Buddhist 
ethics, as it remains murky in other ethical worlds, too.  For instance, in an ethnographic 
examination of Tibetan monastics living in India, Eisen and Konchok (2018, 38) found 
that about half of monastics who had studied microbes under a microscope decreed them 
as sentient and capable of suffering while the other half did not, with sentience and the 
ability to suffer determining one’s status as a traditional Buddhist moral actor (Keown 
2001, 35).  Therefore, although we may surmise that the Buddha would have wanted to 
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extend nonharm to Martian microbes and thus avoid large-scale ecological manipulation, 
other Buddhists may differ, and we may be wrong about the Buddha himself. 
Buddhist scriptural responses to ecological manipulation become more opaque if 
no life is found on Mars.  Although Buddhism maintains a substantial ethic for living 
entities like animals, as I have mentioned, there exists almost no environmental ethical 
valuation for stone or other abiotic ecologies in themselves (Capper 2015, 65-67).  
Buddhism treasures life that can reincarnate and therefore, as the Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra 
portrays it, is of ‘the same nature’ as humanity in terms of the capacity for human-like 
suffering (Suzuki 1973, 212); perceived lifeless things like stones, in scriptures from 
across Buddhist traditions, do not reincarnate or experience human-like suffering and 
therefore essentially exist for the service of living beings.   
This situation arises in part because Buddhism posits a dimension of reality 
known as the sattvaloka, or realm of living beings such as humans and animals, which is 
synonymous with samsara, or the five- or six-tiered universe of rebirth (Harris 2007, 
150).  Alternatively, the bhājanaloka, or container realm, consists of nontransmigrating 
entities, such as plants, minerals, and water, which provide a relatively spiritually inert 
backdrop for the realms of rebirth through which sentient beings transmigrate.  Stone 
entities belong to the bhājanaloka.  Generally speaking, only sattvaloka entities enjoy 
moral relevance in terms of demanding moral action like that of nonharm, and 
bhājanaloka entities like mineral formations and water bodies receive little ethical 
valuation in themselves (150).  The current Dalai Lama, in fact, explicitly describes the 
bhājanaloka world of stones as ‘secondary’ and of lesser moral value than the sattvaloka 
realm of beings who reincarnate (Lopez 2008, 70). 
To be fair, there are special Buddhist stones, such as Japan’s Fujito Stone at the 
Daigoji temple in Kyoto, or special collections of stones, such as China’s holy Buddhist 
mountain Wutaishan.  But beyond exceptional instances like these, for reasons that I have 
mentioned broad regard for stones as worthy of environmental ethical valuation remains 
almost entirely absent from the teachings of the Buddha as well as broader Buddhist 
systems.  The Buddha, in fact, explicitly approved of the use of stones (Pāli: pāsāṇo) for 
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constructing human buildings, walkways, footwipers, bed supports, and monastery 
assembly halls, among other outcomes (Ṭhānissaro Bhikkhu 2013, 346, 657, 679, 719, 
736).  Moreover, scriptures like the Bodhicaryāvatāra instruct that we should avoid 
‘breaking up clods of earth…without any purpose’ (Shantideva 1995, 38), but such 
passages are both rare in appearance and vague in terms of what ‘purpose’ means.   
Unfortunately, given this Buddhist worldview but also appreciating the important 
roles played by mineral formations in both biotic and abiotic processes, to this point 
Buddhist environmental ethics fail the test of robustness because they cannot adequately 
protect the instrumental, scientific, functional, aesthetic, and cultural value of abiotic 
stony places (Gray 2004, 65) like those typical of the surface of Mars.  This constitutes 
no small problem, for only by possessing an environmental ethical relevant to the 
protection of abiotic geodiversity can Buddhist ethics more fully participate in activities 
like the praxis of climate change mitigation on Earth (Ajani et.al. 2013, 61) or protection 
of abiotic locales on Mars. 
Therefore, especially if no life is found on Mars, Buddhist scriptures, originating 
in other times, supply little direction regarding both the environmental protection of 
abiotic locales as well as the ethics of planetary ecological manipulation.  However, 
contemporary Buddhists, especially those from spacefaring countries like the United 
States, enjoy access to information that the scripture writers lacked.  By consulting some 
of these latter-day Buddhists we find surprisingly innovative Buddhist ethical outlooks as 
well as some firm rejections of the proposal to make Mars more Earthlike. 
 
American Buddhists in the Ethnographic Field 
Although for this essay I collected ethnographic field data from statistically 
significant groups of Theravāda, Mahāyāna, and Vajrayāna Buddhists alike, here I treat 
American Buddhism as a nondenominational phenomenon.  I do so because the 
qualitative scriptural injunctions that I previously mentioned appear relatively similarly in 
scriptures across schools.  Moreover, my quantitative field data reveal no significant 
differences across sects as checked by pairwise two-tailed Fisher’s exact statistical tests 
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of independence, so that the data employed here do not incite concern with differential 
attitudes across sects. 
Buddhism was introduced to the United States in the nineteenth century and then 
exploded in visibility starting in the 1950’s, and since then American Buddhism has been 
marked by an environmentalist sensibility.  The scholar of Buddhism Richard Seager 
(1999, 215) even proclaimed American Buddhism the ‘eco-centric sangha’ because of 
appearances such as strong bioregional environmentalism (Kaza 1997, 219-248), 
conservationist practices (Capper 2015, 59-65), and integration of environmental 
activism into spirituality (Koizumi 2010, 133-145).  American Buddhists therefore 
offered two advantages for this study resulting from the ethnographic field.  First, some 
Buddhists were eager to participate in this project since they appreciated its 
environmental concerns.  In addition, living in the spacefaring culture of the United 
States, these Buddhists enjoy familiarity with the issues at hand. 
Among these Buddhists I undertook survey-based field work, approved by my 
university’s Institutional Review Board, between March and June of 2019.  I chose 
surveys over interviews as my main ethnographic tool because I expected opinions on 
subjects like the planet-wide ecological manipulation of Mars to be too brief to be helpful 
in an interview format as well as because I wanted to touch on numerous topics as a part 
of a larger project.  Nonetheless, copious spaces for comments on my survey as well as 
my physical presence in Buddhist centers amply invited additional narrative comments, 
some of which I share here.   
In the field I obtained significant samples from all of the three Buddhist main 
branches of Theravāda (N=44), Mahāyāna (N=40), and Vajrayāna (N=37), which, taken 
together, supplied 121 overall Buddhist samples.  Theravāda centers studied included 
Center A (N=27), an outgrowth of the Thai Mahanikai lineage in Atlanta, Georgia, and 
Center B (N=17), which practices vipassanā meditation with eclectic Thai and Burmese 
roots in New Orleans, Louisiana.  Center C (N=34) in Baton Rouge, Louisiana, supplied 
Vietnamese Thiền school Mahāyāna samples to supplement those derived from Center D 
(N=6), a place for the traditional practice of Sōtō Zen in New Orleans.  Vajrayāna 
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samples emerged from Center E (N=12), a Nyingma Buddhist community in Lafayette, 
Louisiana; Center F (N=10) in Covington, Louisiana, which has a hybrid Nyingma/Géluk 
lineage; and the Géluk-affiliated Center G (N=15) in New Orleans. 
Portraying the demographics of the centers that I studied requires a bit of 
theoretical discussion because of some upheaval in the study of American Buddhism.  
Since the 1970s the study of American Buddhism typically has followed Prebish’s (1979, 
171-172) ‘two Buddhisms’ model or Nattier’s (1998, 183-195) ‘three Buddhisms’ model 
in describing American Buddhists.  However, in recent years both of these models have 
come under attack for failing to comprehend the true nature of American Buddhist 
practices (Han 2017, 1-24), obscuring issues of ethnicity (Spencer 2014, 35-61), and 
‘unconscious white privilege’ (Hickey 2010, 1-25).  Respecting these critiques, in this 
essay I take a fresh approach. 
The scholar of American Buddhism Jeff Wilson (2010, 195-208) describes how 
tensions at the Rochester Zen Center developed between desires to remain as faithful as 
possible to Asian on-the-ground models of Buddhism and goals to innovate the tradition 
to reflect its new American home.  Such tensions remain widespread in American 
Buddhism beyond the Rochester Zen Center, so I utilise them to create a new 
understanding.  Following the work of the sociologist of American religion Mark Chaves 
(2017, 89), in this essay I will define the wish to adhere as closely as possible to 
perceived Asian on-the-ground realities as conservative American Buddhism while I 
define the wish to adapt the tradition to the United States as liberal American Buddhism.  
With these definitions in mind, one quickly sees that there exist myriad issues on which 
any individual, whether an immigrant or a ‘convert’ (Prebish 1979, 171-172), can be 
conservative or liberal.  In fact, it is not uncommon to find practitioners from across 
ethnicities who exhibit conservative-style reverence for monastics while they also follow 
liberal personal rules for food and drink, and there remain numerous other scenarios.  The 
point is that here I intend a spectrum between conservative and liberal opinion positions 




Following this spectrum, through its membership every center will provide a 
home to diverse opinions of individuals on different issues.  However, in order to develop 
stable institutional identities and follow institutional missions, centers themselves will 
condition their messages and practices to reflect specific orientations on the spectrum, 
such as a center that chooses to offer classes on meditation as self-therapy rather than to 
perform traditional bodhimaṇḍala offering rituals for local spirits.  While humans cannot 
be categorised by my spectrum, Buddhist centers can. 
In this light, two of the seven centers that I studied should be described as mixed 
centers, since they intentionally purvey both conservative and liberal doctrines and 
practices at alternate times.  The other five centers in my study were more frankly of the 
liberal Buddhist variety.  To learn from all points of view, I reached out to a number of 
centers that may be considered conservative without receiving an invitation to study in 
those places.  Perhaps my secular effort to shape Buddhist ethics to extraterrestrial 
realities ran against conservative points of view too much.  Whatever the orientation of 
the centers in my study, though, my survey cohort includes practitioners with little 
experience with Buddhism, many long-time dedicated lay practitioners, and six 
monastics.  
So that we may perceive American Buddhist perspectives apart from those that 
are more generally American, I compare Buddhist survey results with those from a 
control sample intended to represent the broader United States public.  I created this 
control sample by surveying 78 random undergraduate students at a small state university 
in the southeastern United States, the same region as the Buddhist centers under 
consideration.  Within this control sample self-reports of religious adherence indicated 
82% were Christian, 9% expressed no religion, 2.6% embraced Hinduism, and 1.3% each 
reported as ecumenical, Wiccan, agnostic, Stoic, and Buddhist, with this last roughly 
matching the same percentage of Buddhists as that found within the general population 
(Mitchell 2016, 6). 
Whether in the Buddhist group or in the control group, respondents took the same 
sixteen prompt survey that forms a part of a larger project.  As a part of this process, 
17 
 
participants encountered this proposal: ‘We transform Mars by injecting gases into the 
atmosphere, thus thickening the air and warming the planet so that it is more Earthlike for 
future human, animal, and plant immigrants.’  Then participants faced four prompts 
relevant to the planet-wide ecological manipulation of Mars: 
1. I think that Buddhist principles should be utilised to guide our actions regarding 
changing Mars’ ecology as proposed. (responses on a five-point scale from 
strongly agree to strongly disagree)  
2. If we do use Buddhist principles regarding changing Mars’ ecology as 
proposed, those principles should be? (choices offered but alternative responses 
welcomed) 
3. Our moon and other extraterrestrial places should be valued and protected from 
undue harm, even if no living beings exist there. (responses on a five-point scale 
from strongly agree to strongly disagree) 
4. Human beings have the right to change the ecologies of other planets, as long 
as no living beings are present. (responses on a five-point scale from strongly 
agree to strongly disagree) 
American Buddhists in this study responded to these prompts in some astonishing ways 
because they offer brilliant examples of folk Buddhist respect for rocks and abiotic places 
while they also significantly reject Beech’s and Zubrin’s pleas to manipulate the ecology 
of Mars.  Now I turn to these results. 
 
Ethnographic results 
Room for environmental ethics innovation emerges first in Buddhist responses to 
the prompt, ‘I think that Buddhist principles should be utilised to guide our actions 
regarding changing Mars’ ecology as proposed.’  Among Buddhists 81.8% (99/121) 
agreed or strongly agreed with applying Buddhist principles to this proposed planet-wide 
ecological manipulation, despite the awareness among many field subjects that Mars may 
be lifeless.  Only 5.8% (7/121) of Buddhists felt that Buddhist ethics were not relevant to 
manipulating planetary ecologies, with 12.4% (15/121) remaining neutral.  Conversely, 
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and unsurprisingly, members of the primarily Christian (82%) control group were much 
less sanguine about applying Buddhist ethics (fewer than 10% strongly agreed that 
Buddhism should be in the conversation), with the independence between Buddhist and 
control samples demonstrated with a Fisher’s exact statistical test of independence 
p<0.0001. 
With these Buddhists’ distinctively asserting the appropriateness of utilising 
Buddhist principles on Mars, the next prompt encouraged Buddhists to choose which 
principles to apply to planet-wide ecological manipulation scenarios.  Recognising that 
Buddhists ethics are not a zero-sum game and multiple principles can apply 
simultaneously, respondents were allowed to choose or provide principles as they wished.  
As Table 1 indicates, a massive 87.6% of Buddhists (106/121) chose the fundamental 
Buddhist philosophical principle of dependent arising, or paṭiccasamuppāda in the Pāli 
language, as an operational ethical platform on Mars.  This key Buddhist principle asserts 
that since all existents arise from one or more causes, no existents manifest independently 
in time or space, so that all of physical reality emerges interdependently.  Thus, against 
the dualistic notions of Beech, Zubrin, and Stoner that presume a separation between 
humans and the rest of the natural world, these Buddhists more ecocentrically chose to 
spotlight their interrelatedness with Mars and its features.  Perhaps this outcome is not 
unexpected, given that paṭiccasamuppāda dependent arising remains a well-used tool in 
the Buddhist environmental ethics toolbox.  Nonetheless, the implicit folk ethical model 
that is collectively employed by these Buddhists arises as one of inclusiveness among 
humans and nonhumans rather than that of the superior human conquest of inferior nature 
that Beech and Zubrin openly encourage.   
Table 1 here 
Although the Buddhist concept of dependent arising is in itself ethically neutral 
(Goleman 2018, 10), these Buddhists charge it morally by combining it with ethical 
injunctions, most especially that of ahimsa nonharm.  After dependent arising, at 81.8% 
(99/121) the second most common choice among Buddhists in terms of principles to 
apply to planetary ecological manipulation emerged from the survey choice of ‘the First 
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Precept, on not harming others.’  In combining dependent arising with nonharm in this 
way, the implicit folk ethical reasoning here creatively facilitates innovative Buddhist 
relationships with abiotic stones.  As described above, in the scriptures nonharm 
generally should be directed only to living beings.  Yet in substantial numbers these 
American Buddhists inventively extend nonharm to planetary features that are presumed 
to be abiotic.  Uniquely these Buddhists add an abiotic dimension to the combination of 
dependent arising and nonharm contained within Traphagan and Traphagan’s (2015, 303-
304) description of Buddhism that ‘all things in the world are interrelated and 
interdependent.  As a result, to cause harm to one point in the network implies the 
causing of harm to all other nodes.’   
Following this original extension of a combination of dependent arising and 
nonharm, the Buddhist response to the third survey prompt has the opportunity 
beneficially to revolutionise Buddhist environmental ethics in addition to maintaining 
relevance to Mars itself.  With the prompt, ‘Our moon and other extraterrestrial places 
should be valued and protected from undue harm, even if no living beings exist there,’ 
66.9% of Buddhists strongly agreed while another 21.5% agreed, leaving a unexpectedly 
remarkable 88.4% (107/121) of Buddhists in favor of extending ahimsa respect and 
protection to abiotic places like may be typical of Mars.  Although, as I have described, 
there exists little scriptural basis for this type of nonharm protection of abiotic stony 
spots, in the folk environmental ethics of these Buddhists one finds clear respect for 
abiotic ecologies.  With a Fisher’s exact test p<0.001, these Buddhists also stood out 
from members of the control sample, only 26.9% of whom strongly agreed with the 
prompt, as Table 2 shows.  It takes more than one cohort of Buddhists to change the 
course of Buddhist environmental ethics, but these Buddhists, besides being divergent in 
their outlooks from the general population, vibrantly accentuate the reality that the 
Buddhist tradition should renovate itself in terms of its abiotic environmental ethics. 
Table 2 here 
Most fascinatingly, as an outgrowth of their extension of interrelatedness and 
nonharm into abiotic realms, these Buddhists on the whole oppose turning Mars into 
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something like Earth’s twin.  As one can see in Table 3, of American Buddhists in this 
study 52% (63/121) either disagreed (26.4%) or strongly disagreed (25.6%) with the 
prompt, ‘Human beings have the right to change the ecologies of other planets, as long as 
no living beings are present.’  Outnumbered roughly two-to-one, only 26% (31/121) of 
Buddhists either agreed (14.9%) or strongly agreed (10.7%).  Comments from Buddhists 
included, ‘I'm really opposed to changing Mars’ climate,’ ‘Not sure we should change 
Mars,’ as well as, ‘Mars’ nature is perfect now.’  Representing the minority, one Buddhist 
said, ‘Consider compassion for future inhabitants of Mars, even if no resident life is 
found,’ while another asserted, ‘Terraforming is cool.’  Thus, while not complete, general 
Buddhist rejection of the right of humans to change large-scale the ecologies of other 
planets remains potent, with twice as many Buddhists disapproving rather than 
approving.   
Table 3 here 
Interestingly, as with Buddhists about 52% (40/78) of the control sample also 
either disagreed or strongly disagreed that humans have the right to manipulate other 
planets in the large-scale.  However, 37.2% (29/78) of members of the control sample 
expressed agreement or strong agreement with the prompt, indicating a greater sense of 
right to manipulate Mars than Buddhists appear to possess.  A Fisher’s exact test returned 
an ambiguous result of p=0.0798 on this count, meaning that at a 10% level of 
significance the Buddhists arise as numerically distinct from the control sample but not 
so at a 5% level of significance.  Nevertheless, contrary to the wishes of Beech and 
Zubrin even members of the control group mostly agree with Buddhists in expressing that 
humans lack the ethical right to engage in the planet-wide ecological manipulation of 
Mars. 
While this cohort of Buddhists by itself does not provide a definitive, once-and-
for-all change in Buddhist ethics with its expansion of the reach of nonharm, the 
Buddhists in this group still supply a useful new voice which helpfully responds to a 
great weakness of Buddhist environmental ethics, the protection of abiotic entities.  Now 





Although just one grouping of individuals from only one religion, these American 
Buddhists make contributions both to space studies as well as to the positive development 
of Buddhist environmental ethics.  For instance, twice as many of these Buddhists deny 
human beings the right to engage in the planet-wide ecological manipulation of Mars as 
approve of the practice.  From this point of view, Beech’s enthusiastic favoritism toward 
humans as a motive for ecological manipulation fails in terms of providing proper ethical 
justification.  Likewise, Zubrin’s exclusive valuing of life falls before American Buddhist 
calls for humans to protect both living and nonliving entities, given that, apparently to 
these Buddhists, humans have duties to more than just life.  This shift reflects the words 
of the ethicist James S. J. Schwartz, ‘If too much emphasis is placed on life, we may 
blind ourselves to reasons for preserving other kinds of environments’ (Schwartz 2016a, 
102).  In the end, these Buddhists provide space studies with an ethical rebuke of the 
proposal to make Mars dramatically more Earthlike. 
More foundationally, Buddhists offer this perspective by implicitly relying on a 
different model for understanding humanity’s place in the universe.  Beech’s human 
favoritism, Zubrin’s sense of conquering Mars in the name of life, and Stoner’s concept 
of ‘wilderness’ all betray dualistic understandings of human separation from nature.  
Conversely, these Buddhists spotlight a new, nondualist understanding of humanity’s 
place in the universe, in which human beings, interconnected with the rest of physical 
reality, exist as counterparts of, rather than overlords of, the rest of the larger natural 
world.  From this, Buddhists express a need to take responsibility not just for human 
welfare as an aspect of existence but also for human interactions with the larger 
nonhuman world, including taking responsibility for interactions with stones.     
The environmental model employed by these Buddhists, being relational in 
character, can provide ethical and scientific benefits to space studies, as Mark Lupisella 
(2016, 81-82) indicates, while the Buddhist extension of the moral community beyond 
simply humans moves us toward the ‘cosmic ethic of environmental protection’ 
22 
 
requested by the astrobiologist Charles S. Cockell (2007, 31).  In addition, with the 
expansion of the limits of nonharm based upon notions of interconnectedness, the 
Buddhist notion of dependent arising operationally ‘offers a philosophical basis for a 
meaningful astroethical paradigm’ by providing a ‘unique possibility of embracing the 
totally other in a far more liberated way’ (Irudayadason 2013, 101, 108).  Finally, by 
responding to the lament of the physicist Victor Mansfield that ‘it is more urgent than 
ever that we find a coherent worldview that can guide our science and our moral actions,’ 
(Mansfield 2003, 319), these Buddhists provide space sciences with such direction in 
their yoking of folk ethical notions of interconnectedness and nonharm toward Mars. 
Moreover, and importantly for Buddhist environmental ethics, this interactive 
model of connectedness, for these Buddhists anyway, provokes the extension of the 
traditional Buddhist value of nonharm beyond traditional boundaries, so that abiotic 
ecologies become protected by the umbrella of ahimsa.  In this study this folk Buddhist 
ethical sensibility distinguishes itself not only categorically from the American 
mainstream culture but also from many traditional Buddhist teachings that overlook the 
instrumental, functional, educational, and cultural value of abiotic locales like mineral 
formations (Gray 2004, 65) that presumably appear on the surface of Mars.  The space 
ethicist William R. Kramer (2011, 257) writes, ‘In the context of space exploration we 
are provided a rare moment to craft policies that reconsider what is ethical and what is 
not,’ and these American Buddhists react positively and constructively to this 
opportunity. 
This innovation regarding Buddhist regard for abiotic locales remains significant.  
As I have argued, an inability to protect the nonliving, such as stones, exists as a great 
weakness within traditional Buddhist environmental ethics, preventing the useful 
application of Buddhist ethics to a variety of situations.  Take, for example, Earth’s 
climate crisis.  While obviously an atmospheric problem, climate change also is a mineral 
problem, since the carbon cycle has been disrupted and carbon that following natural 
processes should be in the ground has been released into the atmosphere instead 
(Rigopoulos et al. 2018, 197).  Hence, one set of strategies for mitigating climate change 
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involves lithospheric carbon sequestration, which absorbs carbon dioxide from the air 
into minerals, typically via chemical reactions in seawater, through the management of 
stone ecologies (Morton 2015, 249-259).  Rigopoulos et al. (2018, 199-205), for instance, 
demonstrate the effectiveness of using submerged dunite to transform atmospheric CO2 
into aragonite mineral precipitates.  A Buddhism that extends a measure of nonharm to 
mineral formations can provide moral direction to ensure environmental responsibility 
within carbon sequestration strategies like these, in this way becoming ethically more 
capable in the struggle with Earth’s climate change.  The folk Buddhist ethical 
innovations found in this article regarding the valuation of lifeless entities thereby bear 
serious positive ramifications for Buddhist environmental ethics on Earth despite their 
development in the context of protecting the environment of Mars. 
 
Conclusion 
In Brian W. Aldiss’s futuristic novel White Mars, Martian colonists insist that to 
be on Mars is to experience the planet’s ethereal beauty and therefore to realise the grave 
mistake that planet-wide ecological manipulation represents (Aldiss 1999, 16).  As a 
result, colonists pursue a non-manipulated Mars as a place of ‘wonder and meditation’ 
(9), and perhaps the American Buddhists in this study seek a similar vision.  Collectively 
they reject the large-scale ecological manipulation of Mars, stressing instead their 
connectedness with the planet and its environs.  Expanding the reach of the traditional 
value of nonharm through a folk Buddhist environmental ethic, they provide a powerful 
new direction for Buddhist moral sensibilities by ameliorating a troublesome weakness, 
the inability to protect stones and other abiotic phenomena.  Although just one grouping 
of Buddhists, these Americans help to improve scholarship by providing useful moral 
insights to space studies while simultaneously delineating positive directions for growth 
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Table 1. If we do use Buddhist principles regarding 
changing Mars’ ecology as proposed, those 
principles should be: 
N=121 Frequency Percent 
Interconnected universe 106 87.6 
Nonharm 99 81.8 
Compassion 78 64.5 
Lovingkindness 68 56.2 
Not sure 6 5.0 
Conscientiousness 1 0.8 
Mars’ nature perfect now 1 0.8 
Meditation 1 0.8 





Table 2. Our moon and other extraterrestrial places should be valued 
and protected from undue harm, even if no living beings exist there. 
Fisher’s exact p< 0.0001 Frequency Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Buddhist Strongly agree 81 66.9 66.9 
Agree 26 21.5 88.4 
Neutral 10 8.3 96.7 
Disagree 1 0.8 97.5 
Strongly disagree 3 2.5 100.0 
Total 121 100.0  
Control Strongly agree 21 26.9 26.9 
Agree 35 44.9 71.8 
Neutral 10 12.8 84.6 
Disagree 10 12.8 97.4 
Strongly disagree 2 2.6 100.0 




Table 3. Human beings have the right to change the ecologies of 
other planets, as long as no living beings are present. 
Fisher’s exact p=0.0798 Frequency Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Buddhist Strongly agree 13 10.7 10.7 
Agree 18 14.9 25.6 
Neutral 27 22.3 47.9 
Disagree 32 26.4 74.4 
Strongly disagree 31 25.6 100.0 
Total 121 100.0  
Control Strongly agree 10 12.8 12.8 
Agree 19 24.4 37.2 
Neutral 9 11.5 48.7 
Disagree 27 34.6 83.3 
Strongly disagree 13 16.7 100.0 
Total 78 100.0  
 
 
